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[17PacRimLPolyJ295] The Representative Power of the Shareholders’ General Meeting Under Chinese Law

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dc.contributor.author Qu, Charles Zhen
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-28T19:37:46Z
dc.date.available 2011-01-28T19:37:46Z
dc.date.issued 2008-03
dc.identifier.citation 17 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y J. 295 en_US
dc.identifier.issn 1066-8632
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1773.1/551
dc.description.abstract Charles Zhen Qu, B.A. (East China Normal University); L.L.B., L.L.M. (University of New South Wales); Ph.D (Australian National University); Assistant Professor, Law School, City University of Hong Kong. Abstract: Under China’s company law regime, the power to represent the company resides not in the board of directors but in an individual person called a legal representative (fading daibiaoren) who is a senior officer of the company. The mechanism of legal representative, however, is often rendered ineffective as it is inherently susceptible to abuse. The mechanism becomes dysfunctional when the legal representative is unavailable. The legal representative’s unavailability, especially when the board of directors is also ineffective, raises the question of whether the general meeting has the power to control corporate actions. To answer this question, this Article considers the legal nature of the legal representative’s role, examines the allocation of the company’s decisionmaking and representative powers, and reviews a small corpus of recent cases which have been or could have been decided on the basis of the general meeting’s power of representation. This Article argues that the legal representative should be regarded as an agent rather than as an organ of the company, and a company’s general meeting should be able to exercise the company’s decision-making and representative power when both the board of directors and the legal representative are ineffective, given the nature of the legal representative’s role and the power allocation under the company law regime in China. en_US
dc.language.iso en_US en_US
dc.publisher Seattle: Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, University of Washington School of Law en_US
dc.subject Article en_US
dc.title [17PacRimLPolyJ295] The Representative Power of the Shareholders’ General Meeting Under Chinese Law en_US
dc.type Article en_US
dc.rights.holder Copyright 2008 by Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association en_US


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